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I. INTRODUCTION
Evicted: Poverty and Profit in the American City, Matthew
Desmond's Pulitzer Prize winning book, in a remarkable way,
focused public attention on the issue of eviction. 1 As important as
the book has been-and it has been quite important-Desmond's
tales were not new to those of us who have been working with low-

* Judith Fox is a clinical law professor at Notre Dame Law School. For
more than two decades she and her students have represented low income clients
in housing matters, including eviction, at the Notre Dame Clinical Law Center.
In addition, she acted as a facilitator for the Indiana Supreme Court during the
housing crisis, mediating foreclosure settlement conferences between
homeowners and borrowers. She served on the Consumer Advisory Board of the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau where, as a member of the mortgage
subcommittee, she did multiple presentations on the issues facing consumers in
land contracts (rent to buy).
1. MATTHEW DESMOND, EVICTED: POVERTY & PROFIT IN THE AMERICAN
CITY (Crown Publishers, 2016).
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income tenants for years. In fact, my favorite part of the book was
the way in which it made me feel as if I were sharing what I have
been observing for years, but what is hidden from most of the people
I interact with daily. The symposium-Eviction, Poverty and other
Collateral Consequences-sponsored by the Dispute Resolution
Institute at Mitchell Hamline School of Law was a similar
experience. It was a rare opportunity for academics, policymakers,
and those who directly serve impoverished populations most
impacted by eviction to meet and discuss this crucial issue. The
stories shared at this event were very similar to those Matthew
Desmond provided in his book. They are, unfortunately, universal.
Desmond, unlike many scholars, did not simply sit on his laurels
after publishing his groundbreaking book. Instead, he has used his
moment of fame to try to make a difference. In 2018, he created the
Eviction Lab, the first "nationwide database of evictions." 2 This,
even more so than the book, was eye-opening. For the first time,
there is a source for eviction statistics nationally. 3 For many,
including myself, the number of evictions occurring in their
community was shocking. South Bend, Indiana, ranked eighteenth
in evictions nationally. 4 Two other Indiana cities, Fort Wayne and
Indianapolis, ranked even higher. 5 Community leaders took note
and became equally concerned and began to ask why the numbers
were so high. Desmond was even invited to town to speak on this
issue. 6 These conversations are being repeated across the nation, and
this symposium was one such example. It was an opportunity to
discuss the problem of eviction and, more importantly, possible
solutions, especially those involving alternative dispute resolution.
This paper attempts to dig deeper into the reasons behind the
eviction numbers and to offer possible policy changes to help
address this national crisis.
Part one of the paper examines some of the suggested causes of
our current, high eviction numbers. Part two explores one alternative
2. EVICTION LAB, https://evictionlab.org/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2019).
3. It should be noted that the eviction lab has thus far has only tracked those
evictions that proceed through court in a formal landlord tenant proceeding.
Informal evictions that did not require court action (foreclosure evictions and tax
sale evictions) are not included in the numbers. As a result, the figures
underestimate the actual number of evictions. Methods: What Data has the
Eviction Lab Collected?, EVICTION LAB, https://evictionlab.org/methods/#whatdata (last visited Dec. 20, 2019).
4. Top Evicting Large Cities in the United States, EVICTION LAB,
https://evictionlab.org/rankings/#/evictions?r=United%20States&a=O&d=evictio
nRate&lang=en (last visited Dec. 20, 2019).
5. Fort Wayne placed 13th and Indianapolis placed 14th. Id.
6. Joseph Dits, Young Stops in South Bend to Talk About Task Force to Fix
Affordable Housing Crisis, SOUTH BEND TRIBUNE (Aug. 15, 2018),
https://www.southbendtribune.com/news/1ocal/young-stops-in-south-bend-tota1k-about-task-force/article_b6c361 ab-4cb8-5392-89db-4d316aaa700f.html.
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dispute intervention: building coalitions with stakeholders to
address deplorable rental conditions. Part three addresses a topic that
was central to the symposium: the role of courts in the eviction
crisis. Finally, in part four, I offer some policy interventions that
may make an impact on this crisis.
II. EXPLORING THE CAUSES OF EVICTION
Scholars have tried to identify the causes of evictions for
decades, finding poverty the obvious and enduring culprit; however,
Desmond offers a novel theory, that eviction is not a condition of
poverty, but instead its underlying cause. 7 Two recent studies
suggest the issue is far more complicated. One, published in 2019,
reviewed seventeen years of eviction data from Cook County,
Illinois, and compared people who were evicted with those whose
cases were dismissed. 8 Those evicted had worse credit histories than
their neighbors who never faced eviction. 9 When comparing those
who were evicted with those whose cases were dismissed, the study
found "no substantial relative increase in financial strain." 10 The
study found that there was a "dramatic increase" in their use of
payday loans in the "[three] years leading up to [the] eviction filing,"
a clear indication of pre-eviction financial strain. 11 Those evicted
were poor before they were evicted. They were not poor because
they were evicted.
An earlier study of New York City Housing Court data had
similar findings. 12 It concluded that evictions do not seem to be "a
principal driver of overall poverty in New York City," largely

7. Why Eviction Matters, EVICTION LAB, https://evictionlab.org/whyeviction-matters/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2019).
8. John Eric Humphries, Nicolas Mader, Daniel Tannenbaum & Winnie
van Dijk, Discussion Paper 2186: Does Eviction Cause Poverty? QuasiExperimental Evidence from Cook County, IL, YALE U. COWLES FOUND. FOR
RES. IN ECON. (July 2019), at 27-28 (a study of 17 years of Cook County Illinois
evictions finding very small difference in the magnitude of long-term economic
strain proceeding eviction cases between those who were evicted and those that
were not evicted).
9. Id. at 13.
10. Id. The researchers do acknowledge some constraints with their research.
For instance, they only looked at families with credit histories, though the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau has documented that nearly 30% of lowincome individuals have no credit history. They are "credit [in]visible." Id at 11.
11. Id. at 15.
12. Robert Collinson & Davin Reed, The Effects of Eviction on Low-Income
Households,
N.Y.U.
30-31
(Dec.
2018),
https://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/upload_documents/evictions_collins
on_reed.pdf (a study of New York eviction cases finding a connection between
eviction and homelessness, but also finding that "formal evictions are probably
not a principal driver of overall poverty in New York City).
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because those being evicted were already living in poverty. 13 What
they did find, however, is that evicted tenants are more likely to
apply to homeless shelters and more likely to spend more time in a
homeless shelter once there. 14 The study also found that eviction
"increases the number of emergency room visits [for households] ..
about seventy percent over the mean for non-evicted
households." 15 Most of these visits are attributed to mental health
stress, though the study observed an overall decline in health due to
evictions. 16 So, while evictions may not cause poverty, they
certainly make impoverished life more unpleasant and more
expensive. These eviction costs are not just born by those being
evicted, they are spread out into society as increased medical costs
and increased needs for emergency services, including emergency
shelter. 17 The poor are more likely to be evicted partially because
more poor people rent. 18 At the same time, the poor are clearly not
the only renters evicted so there must be more to the story.
Eviction is also expensive for the landlords, neighbors, and
society generally. Yet, as a society, we clearly favor the right of the
owner over the renter. Eviction is viewed almost as a moral right of
ownership, supported by the government. 19 Professor Desmond
argues that governmental support and intervention make the eviction
problem worse. According to Desmond, governmental policy that
"legitimizes and defends landlords' right[s] to charge as much as
they want," "forcibly removes a family at landlords' request by
dispatching armed law enforcement officers" and "records and
publicizes evictions, as a service to landlords and debt collection
agencies" causes exploitation in the housing markets. 20 The
shortage of low-income rentals, coupled with the deplorable
condition of many of the available low-income rental properties
13. Id. at 31.
14. Id. at 24.
15. Id. at 25.
16. Id. at 26. There is an extensive body of research linking foreclosure
evictions to poor health outcomes. It seems clear that rental evictions would have
similar ill effects. See LINDA E. FISHER & JUDITH Fox, THE FORECLOSURE ECHO:
How THE HARDEST HIT HAVE BEEN LEFT OUT OF THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY,
152-55 (Cambridge U. Press, 2019).
17. Ending Chronic Homelessness Saves Taxpayers Money, NATIONAL
ALLIANCE
TO
END
HOMELESSNESS,
https://endhomelessness.org/resource/ending-chronic-homelessness-savestaxpayers-money-2/ (last visited Mar. 29, 2020).
18. "A majority (53 percent) of households earning less than $35,000 rent
their housing," while more than "60 percent of households earning less than
$15,000" rent. America's Rental Housing 2017, JOINT CENTER FOR HOUSING
STUDIES OF HARV. U., (2017) [hereinafter Rental Housing].
19. In fact, one of the indices of property ownership is the right to exclude
others. E.g. Jonathan Klick & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Value of the Right to
Exclude: An Empirical Assessment, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 917, 955-56 (2017).
20. Desmond, supra note 1, at 307.
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have left many vulnerable to this exploitation. 21 Eviction is complex
and while it is impossible to pinpoint a single cause, all these factors
ring true to many, like myself, who work daily with people facing
eviction. 22 In the end, it is nonpayment of rent, for whatever reason,
that most often prompts an eviction filing. 23 Many people across
America simply do not have enough money to pay rent.
A. Affordability

The problem of rental affordability has been growing for
decades. 24 The Great Recession exacerbated the problem, 25 and
even now, homeownership rates are considerably lower than their
peak in 2005, largely due to the financial crisis of 2008. 26
Homeowners continue to be disproportionately white, with African
Americans having the lowest ownership rate. 27 Furthermore, six
million households left the housing market because of the
foreclosure crisis, 28 yet we have failed to see a corresponding rise in
the number of rental households. 29 These displaced homeowners
need somewhere to live, and this has put a strain on the market.
Where did all those households go? Fewer households have been
created than would be expected when considering both the
foreclosure numbers and demographic changes over time. The result
is a "net shortfall of 5.2 million" households. 30 This shortfall is
made up of "renters displaced by the diverted homeowners" and
21. Tracey Ross, Chelsea Parsons & Rebecca Vallas, Creating Safe and
Healthy Living Environments for Low-Income Families, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS,
(July
20,
2016),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/poverty/reports/2016/07/20/ 141324/cr
eating-safe-and-healthy-living-environments-for-low-income-families/.
22. See David A. Dana, An Invisible Crisis in Plain Sight: The Emergence
of the "Eviction Economy, "Its Causes, and the Possibilities for Reform in Legal
Regulation and Education, 115 MICH. L. REV. 935, 943 (2017) (critiquing
Michael Desmond's explanations for the high number of evictions).
23. For example, in a recent, yet unfinished, research project to examine
what occurs in small claims eviction hearings, our team observed 77 eviction
hearings in three Indiana Counties. Nonpayment of rent was cited as the reason
for the eviction in 64 of those 77 cases. Lease violations was the reason in most
others.
24. See John M. Quigley & Steven Raphael, Is Housing Unaffordable? Why
Isn't It More Affordable?, 18 J. ECON. PERSP. 191, 198-200 (2004).
25. See Dowell Myers, Gary Painter, Hyojung Lee & JungHo Park, Diverted
Homeowners, the Rental Crisis and Foregone Household Formation, RESEARCH
INST. FOR Hous. AMERICA, 6 (2016).
26. Dept. of Commerce, U. S. Census Bureau News, Quarterly Residential
Vacancies and Homeownership, Fourth Quarter 2019 (CB19-157, Jan. 30, 2020),
https://www.census.gov/housing/hvs/files/currenthvspress.pdf.
27. Rental Housing, supra note 18, at 2.
28. Myers et al., supra note 25, at 11.
29. Id.
30. Id.
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"[m]illennials who were denied opportunity to form households in
the first place." 31 Those over age 55 form the largest group of new
renters entering the market, with this number increasing by more
than 4 million since 2005. 32
Figure 2

Median Asking Rent for Vacant for Rent Units: 1995-2019
(C,ment Dollars)
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Chart One: Rental Increases from 1995-2019 33
While vacancy rates for both homeowners and renters have
declined, the post-recession drop in vacancies for renters has been
much more dramatic. At the end of the fourth quarter of 2019, the
U.S. Census Department determined that the rental vacancy rate was
down 6.4 percent from a high of 9.8 percent in the third quarter of
2011, the end of the recession. 34 Basic rules of supply and demand
tell us that as the supply decreases and demand increases, prices will
rise; and they have risen. 35
Rent has risen for all demographic groups, but the crisis is more
acute for low-income families, especially families of color. 36 Nearly
31. Id.
32. American Families Face A Growing Rent Burden, THE PEW
CHARITABLE TR. 5 (Apr. 2018) [hereinafter Rent Burden].
33. Dept. of Commerce, U. S. Census Bureau News, Quarterly Residential
Vacancies and Homeownership, Fourth Quarter 2019 (CB20-05, Jan. 30, 2020),
https://www.census.gov/housing/hvs/files/currenthvspress.pdf.
34. Dept. of Commerce, U. S. Census Bureau News, Quarterly Residential
Vacancies and Homeownership, Fourth Quarter 2019 (CB20-05, Jan. 30, 2020),
https://www.census.gov/housing/hvs/files/currenthvspress.pdf.
35. See Myers et al., supra note 25, at 14 (noting that decreasing vacancies
contributed to rental increases from rents likely increased from 2006-12).
36. See, e.g .. Whitney Airgood-Obryski & Jennifer Malinsky, Estimating the
Gap in Affordable and Available Rental Units for Families, JOINT CTR. FOR
HOUSING
STUDIES
OF
HARV.
U.
(Apr.
2019),
https ://www; .jchs .harvard.edu/research-areas/working-papers/estimating-gapaffordable-and-available-rental-uni ts-families; Liza Getsinger, Lily Posy,
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half of all renters are minorities and "one in five rental households
is foreign-bom." 37 The percentage of income that renters spend on
housing has increased steadily since 1960, but the rise has been most
significant for low-income renters. 38 In 2015, more than a third of
all renters were considered rent-burdened. Rent burdened means
that someone spends more than thirty percent of his or her pretax
income on rent. 39 For African American families, the numbers are
much worse. By 2015, forty-six percent of all African American
families were rent burdened, and twenty-three percent were severely
rent burdened. 40
The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
("HUD") found that "8.3 million renters ... have very low incomes,
lack housing assistance, and have either severe rent burdens or
severely inadequate housing (or both)." 41 The most recent research
conducted by the National Low Income Housing Coalition found
that "only 35 homes exist for every 100 extremely low-income
renter household." 42 The Urban Institute created both a report and,
based on that research, an interactive map, displaying the number of
housing units available to extremely low-income renters by
county. 43 According to the 2017 update, discussing 2014 data, St.
Joseph County, Indiana (home of South Bend) has only forty-nine
Graham MacDonald, Josh Leopold & Katya Abazjian, The Housing Affordability
Gap for Extremely Low-Income Renters in 2014, URB. INST. (Apr. 2017),
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/89921/gap_map_report.pdf
; Elizabeth La Jeuneese, Alexander Hermann, Daniel McCue & Jonathan Spader,
Documenting the Long-Run Decline in Low-Cost Rental Units in the US by State,
JOINT CTR. FOR HOUSING STUD. OF HARV. U. (Sept. 2019),
https ://www .jchs .harvard. edu/research-areas/working-papers/documenting-longrun-decline-low-cost-rental-units-us-state; U.S. DEPT. OF HOUSING AND URB.
DEV. OFFICE OF POLICY DEV. AND RES., WORST CASE HOUSING NEEDS, 2017
REPORT
TO
CONGRESS
(2017)
https ://www.huduser.gov/portal/ sites/default/files/pdf/W orst-Case-HousingNeeds. pdf.
37. Rental Housing, supra note 18, at 2.
38. Quigley & Raphael, supra note 24, at 198, T. 3.
39. Rent Burden, supra note 32, at 11.
40. Id. A Severely rent burdened tenant is defined as someone whose rent is
more than fifty percent his pretax income.
41. S. DEPT. OF HOUSING AND URB. DEV. OFFICE OF POLICY DEV. AND RES.,
WORST CASE HOUSING NEEDS, 2017 REPORT TO CONGRESS 4 (2017)
https ://www.huduser.gov/portal/ sites/default/files/pdf/W orst-Case-HousingNeeds. pdf; "Very low incomes are those incomes of no more than 50 percent of
the Area Median Income (AMI), and extremely low incomes are those incomes
of no more than 30 percent of AMI-typically below the poverty line." Id. l n. 4;
"Severe rent burden means a renter household is paying more than one-half of its
income for gross rent (rent and utilities)." Id. at 2.
42. The Gap: A Shortage Of Affordable Homes, NAT'L Low INCOME
HOUSING
COALITION,
2
(2018),
https://reports.nlihc.org/sites/default/files/gap/Gap-Report_2018.pdf.
43. Getsinger, supra note 36.
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homes available for every hundred low income renters, but these
figures really only account for the number of units, not whether
those units are available and habitable. 44 While rent has risen
substantially in the last four decades, renters' income remain
stagnant. 45 As a result, the portion of income families must devote
to housing has increased. 46
Again, as the demand for affordable housing has increased, the
supply has decreased. During the Great Recession, housing
construction came to a standstill. 47 When construction has occurred,
new rental construction has heavily been in favor of multi-family,
high-end rentals. 48 This is largely due to the high cost of
construction. 49 It is just not economically feasible to build lowincome rental housing. As a result, much of the low-income housing
needs are now being met by older, existing housing. 50 The
government has been reducing federal expenditures on housing
since the Regan administration, failing to build new low-income
housing units or maintain existing units. Government policy
strongly favors homeownership over renting. 51 This perfect storm
created by dwindling supply, growing demand, and stagnating
wages have combined to create a housing affordability crisis being
felt across the nation.
B. Institutional Landlords

Many homeowners lost their homes to foreclosure during the
Great Recession. These previously owner-occupied properties are
being converted to rentals. 52 This has created new problems for
prospective homeowners and renters alike. Encouraged by the
government, private-equity and hedge funds have entered the
market, spending a "combined $36 billion on more than 200,000
homes in ailing markets across the country." 53 Institutional investors
are buying large quantities of single-family homes primarily to turn
them into rental properties. As one analyst put it, single-family
44. Id.
45. Lawrence Mishel, Elsie Gould & Josh Bivens, Wage Stagnation in Nine
Charts,
ECON.
POL'Y
INST
6
(Jan.
5,
2015),
https://www.epi.org/publication/charting-wage-stagnation/.
46. Quigley & Raphael, supra note 24, at 198.
47. Myers et al., supra note 25, at 14.
48. Rental Housing, supra note 18, at 17.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 3.
51. Fisher & Fox, supra note 16, at 6-9.
52. Rental Housing, supra note 18, at 2.
53. Alana Semuels, When Wall Street is Your Landlord, THE ATLANTIC 2
(Dec.
19,
2019),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archi ve/2019/02/single-familylandlords-wall-street/582394/.
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rentals are now the "' darlings' of the real-estate sector." 54 As a
result, there are fewer available homes for those who want to be
homeowners and sometimes the landlord is less than ideal.
Institutional investors do not have the best track record as
landlords. Institutional owners often file evictions very quickly,
even when a tenant is a day late on the rent. They may not
necessarily be seeking to evict. Instead, the filings allow
institutional landlords to charge late fees and collect attorney costs,
along with the amount of rent owed which the tenant must pay to
avoid the eviction. 55 But often landlords do seek to evict. An
investigation into the institutional landlords in Atlanta discovered
they "were 18 percent more likely to evict than small landlords." 56
Mom and Pop landlords 57 are often more willing to work with their
tenants when they encounter hard times. If a landlord lives within
the community, he or she is easy to reach when a problem occurs.
On the other hand, out-of-state landlords are able to change their
management company or, strangely, sometimes simply disappear.
One Notre Dame Clinical Law client went to their management
company to pay their rent and was told, unbeknownst to them, that
the management company had been fired. We spent five years trying
to locate the out of state homeowner to no avail. The property
ultimately sold at a tax sale.
Institutional landlords also change with little notice to the
renters. The Notre Dame Clinical Law Center recently experienced
this while working with approximately 50 families from Western
Manor, formerly a low-income housing project in South Bend. The
housing project had been funded through the Low-Income Housing
Tax Credit Program ("LIHTC"). 58 The LIHTC was created in 1986
to fund the construction or rehabilitation of low-income housing. 59
As a condition for receiving the credit, the investor had to provide a
certain number of low-income housing units, although some could
remain at market rates. The building also had to provide those lowincome rental units for thirty years; but then they were able to stop
offering them as low-income rental units. 60 This is exactly what
54. Id. at 15.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 12.
57. By Mom and Pop landlords, I am referring to those landlords who own
several properties as opposed to the institutional investors who typically own
hundreds.
58. 26 U.S.C. § 42 (1986).
59. Id.; see also Andrea J. Boyack, Equitably Housing (Almost) Half a
Nation of Renters, 64 BUFF. L. REV. 109, 134-42 (2017).
60. See generally Corianne Payton, Amanda Gold & Nicole DuBois, The
Low-Income Housing Tax Credit How it Works and Who it Serves, URBAN INST.
(July
2018),
https ://www.urban.org/si tes/default/files/publication/9 875 8/li the _how _it_works
_and_who_it_serves_final_2.pdf.
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occurred at Western Manor: the obligation expired, so the apartment
complex was sold to an out of state investor. 61 In fairness, the
investor had spent a significant amount of money making long
overdue repairs to the apartments. In return, however, all the units
were then converted to market rate. The complex housed two
hundred families, most of whom could no longer afford to live in
the units.
To further exacerbate the problem, utilities at Western Manor
had always been included in the rental rate. With thirty-days' notice,
tenants found their rent was increasing by as much as seventy-five
percent and tenants had to begin paying utilities. 62 Many of these
residents had not had utilities in their name for decades. Therefore,
the utility company demanded deposits of up to $600 dollars. A
panic developed. Community meetings were held with standingroom only capacity. Local media and politicians became involved. 63
Everyone seemed surprised when I informed them that it is perfectly
legal to increase the rent and require tenants to pay for utilities. 64 In
fact, institutional landlords are more likely to raise, and continue to
raise rent and accompanying costs. 65 Indiana, like most parts of

61. Boyack, supra note 59, at 137 (This problem is occurring across the
nation as LIHTC apartment complexes are aging out of their compliance periods.
Between 1995 and 2014 there were 1420 projects funded in this way. The lowincome mandates on these will begin to expire in 2025.).
62. Lauren Becker, Tenants in Western Manor Apts say they 're being forced
out, with rent increasing over $200, WSBT (Aug. 1, 2019),
https://wsbt.com/news/local/tenants-in-western-manor-apts-say-theyre-beingforced-out-with-rent-increasing-over-200; Jeff Parrott, Tenants of Western Manor
apartments in South Bend angry about rent increase, SOUTH BEND TRIB. (Aug.
14, 2019), https://www.southbendtribune.com/news/business/tenants-of-westernmanor-apartments-in-south-bend-angry-about/article_548cb55a-6fef-581 c-912c9a94 lf26bb32.html.
63. Monica Murphy, Community leaders step up to help residents at Western
Manor
Apartments,
WNDU
(Aug.
30,
2019),
https://www.wndu.com/video?vid=558764092 (All the attention did have some
positive results. Several charitable organizations worked with the residents to get
the utility deposits paid. In addition, the tenants have formed a not-for-profit to
assist other tenants facing these issues in the future.).
64. It should be noted that most of the tenants did not have current leases, so
they were month-to-month tenants. The few with valid leases will not face the
increases until their leases expire. Month-to-month tenancies are common among
low income clients. They also provide the least protection against eviction.
65. Semuels, supra note 53, at 12-14.
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America, has no rent control statutes. 66 Many Western Manor
families were evicted, and many more left voluntarily. 67
Those who stayed faced problems as well-issues experienced
by many tenants who suddenly find themselves with an institutional
landlord. Many of the tenants were elderly who had previously paid
rent by visiting the first-floor office in person when their Social
Security checks arrived. The new owner required them to mail their
checks to Wisconsin, virtually guaranteeing that rent would be late,
and then charged a late fee. Again, tenants of institutional landlords
report higher fees and less maintenance, partially due to the distance
between the landlord and the property. 68 When the tenants
complained of the new rent payment requirements, they were
provided with a phone application from which to pay the rent,
something that was not helpful to the several octogenarian tenants
without smart phones and no desire to acquire one.
Institutional landlords like to set up standard practices for all
their tenants, but standard practices do not always work in states
with different legal requirements. Western Manor, located in
Indiana, continues to follow a process governed by Wisconsin law.
This caused some confusion in the early days of the transition. In
fairness, the massive media attention has made a difference. This
institutional owner has listened to community concerns. It is
making repairs to Western Manor, a property neglected for years.
Despite this, communication is still difficult. Tenants who have for
years been able to talk to the local maintenance worker must now
call or write to an out-of-state entity, something many are
uncomfortable with and some do not have the capacity to
accomplish. Tenants of institutional landlords often complain about
the lack of maintenance and the inability to reach anyone to do
anything about it. 69

66. Melissa Adan, Tenants Suffer as California Rent Control Law Looms,
NBC
SAN
DIEGO
(Nov.
12,
2019),
https://www.nbcsandiego.com/news/local/tenants-suffer-as-california-rentcontrol-law-looms/2109620/ (California passed Assembly Bill 1482 that will cap
rent increases from 7 to 8% a year. Unfortunately, this prompted landlords to
increase rent quickly, before the law goes into effect in 2020.); Bobby Allen, New
York Landlords call Rent Control Laws an 'Illegal Taking' in New Federal
Lawsuit, NPR (July 12, 2019); See John W. Willis, Short History of Rent Control
Laws, 6 CORNELL L. REV. 54 (1950) (New York passed a renter protection and
rent stabilization bill that was quickly challenged by landlords in federal court).
67. Informal evictions are hard to track. The Eviction Lab data is likely
underestimating the number of evictions.
68. See, Semuels, supra note 53.
69. Id.
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C. Substandard Housing

Unfortunately, all these factors have led to a second problem in
the rental market: the large number of substandard housing units in
the market. There is ample evidence that housing conditions,
especially in low-income neighborhoods, are quite bad. 70 Many of
the single-family rentals that have come into the market postrecession were previously foreclosed properties.
Foreclosed
properties tend to be under-maintained. 71 While it is easy to
understand how low incomes and high rents contribute to eviction,
it is not as obvious to understand the connection between eviction
and substandard housing.
When low-income homeowners lose their properties to
foreclosure, investors replace them in many of those neighborhoods
by purchasing the properties. In 2011, the What Works
Collaboration funded studies in four cities (Las Vegas, Cleveland,
Atlanta and Boston) to determine the impact of investors in this
REO market. 72 An overview of all four studies found that at the
initial stages of the mortgage foreclosure crisis, most investors were
small, at least early on. 73 This began to change, especially in
distressed communities, when targeted sales organized by HUD,
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac began selling large nonperforming
loan portfolios. While originally advertised as a way for
homeowners to save their home through loss mitigation, it soon
became clear that investors had no interest in working with
borrowers. Most properties were foreclosed and then rented or
flipped. 74

70. GREEN
&
HEALTHY
HOMES
INITIATIVE,
https://www.greenandhealthyhomes.org/home-and-health/home-health-hazards/
(last visited Mar. 20, 2020) (The Green and Healthy Home Initiative claims that
"six million households live with moderate to severe housing hazards. The Green
and Healthy Homes Initiative originated in Maryland in 1986 as an effort to
combat lead poisoning in children. It has evolved to include multiple
municipalities in efforts to address areas of substandard housing. South Bend
recently joined the initiative.); ADVANCING HEALTHY HOUSING: A
STRATEGY
FOR
ACTION,
1,
8
(2013),
https://www.hud.gov/program_offices/healthy_homes/advhh (citing to U.S.
Census data, a 2013 Report from the Federal Healthy Homes Work Group claims
"millions of homes have moderate to severe housing problems").
71. FISHER & Fox, supra note 16, at 152.
72. Christopher Herbert, Irene Lew & Rocio Sanchez-Moyano, The Role of
Investors in Acquiring Foreclosed Properties in Low- and Moderate-Income
Neighborhoods: A Review of Findings from Four Case Studies, JOINT CTR. FOR
HOUSING
STUDIES
OF
HARV.
U.
1,
5
(Oct.
2013),
https ://www .jchs .harvard. edu/si tes/default/files/w 131 l_herbert_lew_moyano. pdf.
73. Id. at 11.
74. FISHER&Fox, supra note 16, at 109-11.
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Many investors who purchased these properties soon discovered
that they were in horrible condition. They were in depressed
neighborhoods. Fixing them up would not be economically feasible,
so they resurrected an old form of sale, with a twist. 75 Institutional
owners began re-selling the properties in rent-to-own, land
contracts. 76 Rent-to-own contracts are highly predatory products for
a number of reasons. What is relevant for this discussion is that they
are created to fail. The contracts place all the burdens of
homeownership--taxes, insurance, and maintenance-on the
"buyer", but none of the benefits. 77 Miss one payment and you are a
renter who can be quickly evicted. In many states, missing one
payment also means losing all your equity and the value of
improvements you may have put into the property. 78
Not all investors are created equal. Allan Mallach identified
classes of investors based on their investment goals: appreciation or
cash flow. 79 Dan Immergluck adapted these categories to divide real
estate investors into two broad groups: (1) those who are buying to
resell; and (2) those who buy to hold and rent. Each of these groups
were further divided into "milkers," "short-term holders," and
"medium-long term holders." 80 The "milker" raises concerns.
"Milkers" look at properties as short-term means of cash flow. They
"minimize any improvements to the property and worry more about
short-term costs than longer-term revenue generation or property
75. See Jeremiah Battle, Sarah Mancini, Margot Sanders & Odette
Williamson, Toxic Transactions: How Land Installment Contracts Once Again
Threaten Communities of Color, NAT'L CONSUMER L. CTR. (July 2016).
76. Land contracts go by different names in different parts of the country.
They can be called deeds for sale, conditional sales or installment land contracts.
Their features, however, are the same. The title to the property remains in the
name of the seller until the buyer has paid 100 % of the selling price. They are
similar as well in that they rarely result in the buyer actually obtaining title to the
property.
77. Alexandra Stevenson & Matthew Goldstein, Rent-To-Own Homes: A
Win-Win For Landlords, a Risk for Struggling Tenants, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 21,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/22/business/dealbook/rent-to-ownhomes-a-win-win-for-landlords-a-risk-for-struggling-tenants.html? _r=O/.
78. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.079 (Texas has the most protection for land
contract buyers. Land contracts are automatically transformed into deeds of trust
and buyers treated as if the home was a mortgage); 2015 Tex. Sess. Law Serv.,
ch. 996, § 8 (effective Sept. 1, 2015). See generally, Skendzel v. Marshall, 301
N.E.2d 64l(Ind. 1973) (Indiana has no statutory protections, but the Indiana
courts have created some common law protections. In 1973, the Indiana Supreme
Court ruled that land contract buyers could not be evicted, and defaults must be
treated as foreclosures unless the buyer had abandoned the property or made only
minimal payments).
79. Allan Mallach, Investors and Housing Markets in Las Vegas: A Case
Study, JOINT CTR FOR HOUSING STUDIES OF HARV. U. 1, 20 (2013).
80. Dan Immergluck, The Role of Investors in the Single-Family Market in
Distressed Neighborhoods: The Case of Atlanta, JOINT CTR. FOR HOUSING
STUDIES OF HARV. U. 1, 20 (2013).
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appreciation." 81 This group is "most likely not to keep properties up
to code, to own substandard housing, and to see a great deal of
turnover in their properties." 82 They tend to be out-of-state
investors, but not always. Research suggests that when investors are
local investors, who have some stake in the community, they are
more likely to maintain their properties. 83 When properties are sold
in bulk, most small, local investors cannot afford to buy. As result,
many purchasers of these large portfolios of properties are
institutional, out-of-town investors who are more likely to be
"milkers."
Rent-to-buy sellers are also "milkers" because they are not
actually selling the property. If they were, there is no reason not to
offer a buyer-financed mortgage. 84 Instead, they milk the property
for profit by shifting the cost of maintenance and rehabilitation to
the buyer while reaping thousands of dollars in down payment
income. Rent is not the money generator. The down payment is. The
table below illustrates the history of with one such property "sold"
to twelve buyers in fourteen years by Rainbow Realty.
Date of Sale

Price

6/7/2004
2/3/2005
3/10/2006
3/1/2007
1/26/2008
3/27/2008
4/14/2008
5/28/2008
7/14/2008
10/26/2015 85
2/25/2016

109,900
116,900
114,900
109,900
109,900
107,900
114,900
114,900
114,900
84,900
84,900

Down
Payment

5,000
6,000
2,000
2,500
2,500
5,000
3,000
3,000
3,500
8,500
8,500

Monthly
Rent

Total Paid
Before Evicted

800
750
750
750
750
750
775
850
850
850
850

14,600
15,000
11,000
11,500
11,500
14,000
12,300
5,500
13,200
18,700
18,700

81. Id. at 21.
82. Id.
83. Sarah Treuhaft, Kalima Rose & Karen Black, When Investors Buy Up
the Neighborhood: Preventing Investor Ownership from Causing Neighborhood
Decline, 23 COMMUNITY INV. 1, 1 (2011).
84. A seller financed mortgage operates like a bank-financed mortgage. The
seller does not give the buyer any funds, instead he receives a mortgage to
guarantee that the loan is repaid. The advantage for the buyers are significant
including the right to a mortgage foreclosure and redemption after default. In
addition, land contract buyers are unable to obtain financing for home repairs,
while a mortgage buyer can get a second mortgage. Land contract buyers also
have difficulty obtaining FEMA aid after a disaster.
85. After 2008, prices plummeted in Indianapolis, as they did across the
nation. But, as the housing prices fell, the rental prices grew.
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1 31231201s
I 104,900 110,soo 1 900
121,300 86
Table two: History of 396 N Huber, Indianapolis 87
It is unclear whether the people who tried to buy these properties
paid all the rent due. It is clear that all were eventually evicted

despite the "seller" collecting $60,000 in option fees. This would be
a profit of more than fifty percent over the asking price of $109,000.
It is unlikely the seller even paid that price for the property. If the
rent was also paid during this period, the profit margin increases to
over 150%. During the rental period, the seller had no maintenance
costs, taxes, nor insurance to pay. Clearly, this is an attractive option
for the seller.
These abusive products began to attract the attention of
policymakers and lawyers alike. The New York Times ran a series
of stories that prompted the federal government to take a closer look
at their role in this problem. 88 Numerous lawsuits were filed across
the nation. In Indiana, one lawsuit may have ended this practice. In
2019, the Indiana Supreme Court held that rent-to-own schemes
were rentals throughout the tenancy period. 89 As such, the property
must be delivered to a tenant in a safe and habitable condition. 90 Any
provisions that attempted to waive these protections were void. 91
This holding had the potential to change rental landscape in
Indiana. 92 Unfortunately, Indiana tenants have not felt the impact of
this decision within eviction court. Instead, tenants in substandard
housing have few alternatives. They can remain in the dangerous
living conditions or they can move elsewhere. However, if they
choose to move, there is virtually nowhere for them to go.

86. The last two entries are for the same buyer who got two contracts on
different dates.
87. Expert Report, Judith Fox, Fair Housing Center of Central Indiana v.
Marshall Welton, 1:18-cv-1098-JMS-DLP.
88. See FISHER & Fox, supra note 16, at 140-44.
89. Rainbow Realty v. Carter, 131 N.E.3d 168,176 (Ind. 2019).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See Florence Wagman Roisman, Indiana Landlord-Tenant Law: An
Important Step Forward in Theory Needs to be Made Real by the Courts, 53 IND.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (for a history of warranty of habitability law in
Indiana and the potential for Rainbow Realty to change the way small claims
courts address condition issues).
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III. BUILDING COALITIONS TowARDS BETTER
HOUSING CONDITIONS

In January of 2019, South Bend community leaders convened a
summit to discuss issues relating to housing and eviction. 93 Over
one hundred people from across the community attended. These
included homeowners, renters, landlords, property investors, social
workers, legislators, legal professionals, academics, and members
of the financial sector. The discussion split into three broad topics:
affordability, sustainability and safety. Conversations continued
after the original session and several issues emerged. The top
concern was the lack of safe, affordable housing; however its
relationship to eviction was still elusive.
Many of the summit participants recounted similar stories.
Tenants were forced to rent substandard housing because no other
suitable housing was available. These substandard homes were not
being rented for substandard prices. Rather, the rental prices were
quite high. Landlords expressed frustration that some were taking
advantage of low-income renters which reflected poorly on the
entire industry. Others asked why tenants would agree to rent
substandard properties at inflated prices. One significant reason was
that landlords who rented these homes often ignored credit histories,
criminal records, and previous evictions. Tenants could rent these
properties without disclosing information that would ordinarily
mark them as an ineligible tenant. Though, once in the properties,
their problems mounted.
The Notre Dame Clinical Law Center has represented tenants
for decades. Their experiences matched those reported at the
summit. Clients often rent properties that fail to meet minimal
housing standards and are over-priced considering both the quality
of the home and prevailing market prices. In desperation, tenants
sometimes withheld their rent in an effort to force the landlord to fix
what he refused to repair. More often, the landlord promises to make
certain repairs before the tenant moves in, but when the tenant
arrives with all their things the repairs remain incomplete. With
nowhere else to go, they move in. Social workers and legal
professionals all describe the same problem: many of their clients
were being evicted because they had withheld rent in an effort to

93. Press Release, City Partners with United Way, Notre Dame Clinical Law
Center
on
Housing
Summit
(Jan.
17,
2019),
available
at
https://southbendin.gov/2019/01/17 /city-partners-with-united-way-notre-dameclinical-law-center-on-housing-summit/ (The event was sponsored jointly by the
Notre Dame Clinical Law Center, the United Way of St. Joseph County, Indiana
and the City of South Bend); Press Release, United Way of St. Joseph County,
Housing
Summit
(Jan.
18,
2019),
https://uwsjc.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/03/housing-summit-release.pdf.
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force the landlord to make these necessary repairs. 94 While it is legal
to withhold rent in some states, the law in Indiana is quite unclear
on that issue. At the time of the summit, there was no clear statute
or case law allowing a tenant to withhold rent. 95 As such, small
claims judges are reluctant to entertain condition arguments as a
defense to eviction.
Though it is too early to determine their real impact, two cases
from late 2019 may change the equation. The first, Husainy v.
Granite Management, LLC, upholds a jury verdict allowing a tenant
to withhold rent when a landlord had failed to make requested
repairs. 96 The jury found a breach of quiet enjoyment for "frequent
interruptions of cold and/or hot water" and heat during the cold. 97
He was awarded the equivalent of six months' rent in damages. 98
The second, Rainbow Realty, discussed in the previous section,
established a clear warranty of habitability in Indiana. 99
A consensus began to develop among the participants of the
summit. Rental properties should be habitable. If we could provide
tenants with more tools to assert their right to habitable housing,
perhaps they would have a better chance in court when faced with
eviction. Better still, if we could ensure that all rental housing was
habitable, we could prevent the conditions that caused people to
withhold rent and face eviction. Yet, how do we get there?
Prior to the summit, I began working with the City of South
Bend on an ordinance to deal with the poor condition of rental
properties. The summit introduced the ordinance to the public. It
was the first step in building coalitions and consensus in support of
real change. Several public meetings were held to review the
ordinance and take public comment. Stakeholders from across the
city met and offered changes to the ordinance. Coalitions of tenants
and homeowners formed in support. Most of the initial opposition
to the bill came from real estate investors. To our surprise, the two

94. It is important to point out that we are not talking about cosmetic items.
We are talking about homes with no heat, no toilets or other bathroom fixtures,
holes in the walls, etc. We are talking about major health and safety issues.
95. See Breezewood Mgmt. Co. v, Maltbie, 411 N.E.2d 670, 671 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1980); Pinnacle Properties Development Group, LLC v. Oliver, 59 N.E.3d
1102 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (an unpublished decision that allowed a tenant to
withhold one month's rent when the landlord failed to repair the air conditioning).
96. Husainy v. Granite Mgmt. LLC., 132 N.E.3d 486, 486 (Ind. Ct. App.
2019) (upholding judgment in favor of a tenant who withheld rent when repairs
were not made); see also Creighton Suter, 'Finally Free': Jury finds in favor of
tenant zn apartment dispute,
THE EXPONENT
(Sept. 20, 2018),
https://www.purdueexponent.org/city/article_27296dc8-d885-5cda-8f38c683cfe94b22.html.
97. See Husainy, 132 N.E.3d at 494.
98. Id. at 495.
99. Rainbow Realty, 131 N.E.3d at 176.

184

MITCHELL HAMLINE L.J. PUB. POL'Y & PRAC.

[41

local landlord associat10ns ultimately spoke in favor of the final
draft. It was a true community collaboration.
On February 25, 2019, the ordinance unanimously passed the
South Bend Common Council. 100 The Rental Safety Verification
Program (RSVP) was bom. 101 As a community, we agreed no one
should be forced to live in an uninhabitable rental unit. Equally
important, we agreed that the landlords who allowed it were sullying
the entire industry and should be stopped. The ordinance passed, but
the work had only just begun. 102
Legal professionals and social workers remain concerned about
the number of people being evicted for withholding rent in an
attempt to force landlords to make necessary repairs. This became a
primary motivating factor in passing the ordinance. While it was our
hope that the ordinance would decrease evictions, we were aware it
would likely cause an increase in the short-term. Many tenants
already occupied uninhabitable homes. Some were even under
vacate and seal demolition orders when they were rented out. Once
identified, the city could not allow people to continue to occupy
these properties. As result, we needed to develop an interim
solution.
The City of South Bend, Notre Dame Legal Aid Clinic, and St.
Vincent DePaul joined together to form an emergency response
team. The code inspectors began enforcement of the RSVP program
with the rental properties already identified as problematic. When
one of these homes was condemned-and many were-the family
would be immediately referred to Notre Dame for possible legal
intervention and to St. Vincent DePaul for emergency housing
assistance. A fund was obtained through grant money to provide
movmg expenses, emergency housing, and first month's rent as
needed.

100. SOUTH BEND IND. MUNICIPAL CODE§ 10644-19 (2019).
101. Rental Safety Verification Program, South Bend, Indiana,
https://southbendin.gov/rental-safety-verification-program-2/ (last visited Feb.
28, 2020).
102. See Associated Press, Advocates Say Indiana Regulation Limit
Threatens
Renters,
U.S.
NEWS
(March
10,
2019),
https ://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/indiana/articles/2020-0310/advocates-say-indiana-regulation-limits-threaten-renters (Despite this good
news, the program now appears in danger. In response to an effort by the city of
Indianapolis to assist renters in eviction, the Indiana House slipped an amendment
into a bill that would disallow any municipality from enacting ordinances on
landlord tenant issues. The Senate rejected the change because it was unrelated to
the underlying bill. The amendments were then inserted into a different Senate
bill and approved. There were no hearings on these amendments, despite protests
by members of the Senate and great public outcry. The bill has not been signed
into law and many advocates are urging him to veto the bill.).
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We quickly realized that we underestimated the demand.
Between May and December of 2019, more than sixteen properties
were condemned, and thirteen families were referred for
assistance. 103 Thus far, all of these families have found alternative
housing, and most have had their money refunded by the landlords,
though a few cases are still pending. However, as December 2019
came to an end, so did our supply of alternative housing. We ran out
of places to send people. A local hotel offered to provide emergency
housing at a discount, but for many families to come, we are left
with the reality that we may not have viable and safe housing options
to replace condemned rental properties.
This project highlights the problem many families face,
especially low-income families. Do you call code enforcement and
risk having the house condemned, or do you continue to live in a
dangerous situation because there is no viable alternative? This
reality becomes especially frustrating when a family is trying to
articulate to a judge why they did not simply move instead of
choosing to withhold rent. Most judges do not understand the reality
of the severe housing crisis. Instead, the tenant is evicted and
becomes another statistic in a growing, national crisis. This reality
leads to the next possible point of intervention: the court system
itself.
IV.

EVICTION COURT

In their contributions to this volume, Professors Spaid and
Bednarczyk discuss the eviction process in depth from the
perspective of many states. I will focus on small claims eviction
court only to the extent that is necessary. While small claims courts
were intended to make it easier for pro se litigants to defend
themselves, they have become a means to quickly move people
through a system they neither understand nor can navigate. 104 In
Indiana, along with most states, eviction hearings are grouped
together on the same calendar. Because of the number of cases, each
tenant has as little as two or three minutes to present a defense to the
eviction.
To make matters more complicated, in Indiana the process is
typically bifurcated. First, there is an immediate possession hearing
where preliminary possession is most often awarded to the
landlord. 105 This is followed by a trial on damages and a final
103. Some families found alternate living arrangements and did not need the
emergency help.
104. Samuel Spaid, A Home Is a Good Thing: An Argument for Changing the
Eviction Process, 41 MITCHELL HAMLINE L. J. OF PUB. POL'Y & PRAC.
(SYMPOSIUM ISSUE) (2020).
105. Some judges will issue permanent possession in the immediate
possession hearing, especially if the tenant fails to appear.
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possessory order. If the landlord is awarded temporary possession,
he must pay a bond to the court before the tenant is required to
vacate. However, the tenant can pay a counter-bond in the same
amount and remain in their home until the final triaI. 106
A. Indiana Court Watch
In 2019, I began a court watch program in small claims courts in
Indiana. The data is very preliminary, but some disturbing
observations have already emerged. We have data from seventyseven eviction hearings in three Indiana counties. Sixty were
immediate possession hearings that resulted in forty-eight evicted
tenants. We found that eighty percent of the cases we observed
ended with an eviction.
Only three tenants successfully defended the eviction. 107 The
first was successful because the landlord admitted to refusing to
accept rent. The second because the landlord illegally locked the
renter out. The third because the renter had already moved. The
emerging data presents a negative trend for those attempting to
defend themselves against an eviction. Many tenants have tried, and
a strong majority have failed.
Even though every tenant has a right to post a counter-bond to
stay eviction pending a final hearing, the judge failed to inform the
tenants of this right in all but three of the sixty cases observed. One
tenant had the audacity to ask the judge about the counter-bond and
was told it would be discussed at the final hearing, when it would be
too late for him to post a bond.
Several years ago, the Indiana Supreme Court became
concerned with the proceedings in Marion County's small claims
court and established a task force to examine small claims
proceedings. 108 Professor Florence Roisman from Indiana
University McKinney Law School submitted, as part of the task
force, a report on landlord-tenant court across the state. 109 The report
documented numerous issues with the small claims court. Despite
her findings, eight years have passed, and little has changed.

106. 32 IND. CODE§ 30-3-8 (2018).
107. The remainder were continued to another day.
108. SMALL CLAIMS TASK FORCE: REPORT ON THE MARION COUNTY SMALL
CLAIMS COURTS 1, 7 (May 1, 2012), https://www.in.gov/judiciary/files/pubssmclaims-rept-2012.pdf. (Marion County small claims courts have a different
structure than the small claims courts in the rest of the state. They are organized
by township. At the time of the investigation, Marion County small claims courts
were not even considered courts of record.).
109. BRIENNE DELANEY & FLORENCE WAGMAN ROISMAN, Report #1 on
Landlord-Tenant
Court
Proceedings
in
Indiana
(Feb.
2012),
https ://mckinneylaw. iu. edu/instructors/roisman/report_ 1_landlord_tenant_proce
edings_in_indiana.pdf.
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Several disturbing practices are emerging from our current court
watch program, which Professor Roisman is also a collaborator. The
most disturbing occurred in the small claims court in Elkhart
County. We witnessed several hearings where the tenant was evicted
with virtually no evidence presented. In one instance, the landlord
had documentary evidence to present. When the landlord attempted
to show the tenant, he was admonished by the judge who demanded,
"Give it to me." The judge looked at it, handed it to his clerk,
admitted it into evidence, and then asked the tenant to react to the
evidence he was not permitted to view. When the tenant could not,
he was evicted.
The small claims courts were intended to be easy for nonlawyers to navigate. This was not the result. To aid litigants through
the small claims courts, Indiana court rules mandates that the
judicial conference create a small claims manual. 110 Such manual is
available to be reproduced and made available to each litigant in
small claims courts across the state. 111 In many courts, my request
to see this manual is usually received with surprise. The manual is
not made readily available, rather accessible solely online; a means
that presents a barrier to many low-income litigants who do not have
access to computers or printers.
More alarming, sections of the manual are entirely inaccurate.
For instance, Indiana Code mandates that every rental property must
be delivered and maintained in a safe and habitable manner and in
accordance with all the applicable housing codes. 112 The manual
states that landlords have no duty "to make repairs to a leased
premises unless the landlord agrees to do so by the lease terms or
otherwise." 113 This is contrary to the statute and the holding in
Rainbow Realty, where the Indiana Supreme Court specifically
stated that landlords are required to deliver a rental property in
habitable condition. 114
B. Court Mediation

Communities across the country have begun to assess the
eviction crisis and propose solutions. Many of these suggestions
include reforms to the court eviction process. These discussions are
not new; over the years, mediation has been the most common
reform suggested and tried. The success of a mediation program is
often measured by the number of agreements achieved, as opposed

110. IND. SMALLCLAIMSR. 13 (2020).
111. Id.
112. 32 IND. CODE§ 31-8-5 (1-2) (2018).
113. SMALL CLAIMS MANUAL, IND. JUDICIAL CTR.
https://www.in.gov/judiciary/files/small-claims-manual.pdf.
114. Rainbow Realty, 131 N.E.3d at 175.
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(2014),
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to the number of evictions prevented. 115 Mediation in small claims
court is problematic for several reasons. Tenants lack information
about their rights. The mediation, a forum intending for equal
bargaining, turns into a negotiation. The set agenda entails how and
when the tenant will pay the landlord and move out of the house.
Another concern is many mediators are not neutral. As employees
of a burdened court system, easing the court docket becomes their
primary role. 116 Every agreement reached in mediation is one less
trial. However, sometimes a trial is necessary. Tenants may feel
pressured to agree because they are outnumbered and
underrepresented, and they may not understand their defenses to the
eviction. When the mediator is perceived to be part of the court
system, a tenant may feel that the judge is exerting pressure to settle.
A settlement reached under these circumstances is not just.
My perception of court mediation programs may be clouded by
my observations. It is important to point out that I am not
philosophically opposed to mediation. I have been a certified
mediator and have mediated mortgage foreclosure cases for the state
of Indiana for the last eight years. My concern is that these programs
are often viewed not as a way to mediate a dispute, but also as a way
to move the docket so the judge does not have to schedule a trial.
When a tenant attempts to assert a defense to eviction, he is
immediately sent to mediation. These mediations resolve very
quickly, usually in a matter of minutes. This suggests that there is
no real evaluation of the issues. In mediation, there are no public
records of the findings. This makes the results are hard to ascertain.
Our ongoing court watch study suggests the result of an eviction
proceeding is almost always an eviction and payment plan to the
landlord. The only time we witnessed a tenant being granted a
hearing before a judicial officer to contest an eviction was when she
was represented by counsel. Unrepresented tenants were always
referred to mediation.
Because of the limited amount of data available, these
observations may well be atypical. Regardless, I will recount two
situations that illustrate these concerns. The first involves a tenant
who claims she had receipts for all her rent payments. At mediation,
it was explained to the tenant that the only issue to discuss was how
much she would pay the landlord and when. It appeared as if an
earlier judgment had gone unpaid and the judge had ordered a bench
warrant for her arrest. She claims she was told to sign the current
115. See Generally William H. Ross, Measuring success in mediation,
JOURNAL
4
(2000)
https ://minds. wisconsin. edu/bitstream/handle/1793/38211/ross2. pdf?sequence= 1
&isAllowed=y.
116. This is not intended to denigrate the role of a mediator and how they are
performing. Mediators are working hard and sincerely according to the mandates
given. It is the mandates that raise concerns.
MEDIATION
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order or be arrested on the prior order. She signed an agreed order
and payment plan. Unfortunately, because mediation proceedings
are confidential, there is no way to know if this is what actually
occurred. What is clear is that this tenant did not perceive this as a
fair process. She believed that she was forced to agree to a judgment
she felt was unjust to avoid going to jail for an unpaid debt. This is
not what mediation should feel like. Mediation should be a process
wherein two fully informed parties come to a mutual agreement; as
opposed to a process where one party has no viable option outside
of agreeing to the landlord's terms. Such instances undermine public
confidence in the court as a fair and neutral forum.
In the second case, the tenant admitted he was behind with his
rent payment and inquired to the judge whether a payment plan
could be a viable remedy. The parties were sent to mediation. As a
result of the mediation, the tenant found himself signing a consent
judgement and order to pay one lump sum, not installments. The
tenant appeared confused as this order was entered into the record.
I was quite similarly confused sitting in the gallery.
Both these situations highlight the disparities in small claims
mediation when parties are unrepresented: neither tenant knew their
rights. In traditional mediation, you can agree to the terms of
settlement and then reduce it to writing. All issues are open for
discussion. Here, the issues seem to be limited to when will you pay
and how much. There is even a pre-printed form to be filled out and
entered. Once entered, it becomes a court order. If you disobey that
order, you can be held in contempt and jailed. Debtors' prisons may
have been abolished in the nineteenth century, but it is not illegal to
jail people for violating court orders. Indiana courts are jailing
people who fail to meet the terms of these payment orders. 117 These
tenants have no idea that by signing these agreements, they are
placing themselves in legal jeopardy. They are not informed of their
right to exemptions from collection. 118 They are not informed of
anything because a mediator is not supposed to inform parties of
their legal rights.
Mediated agreements are virtually impossible to set aside. The
proceedings are not of record and mediators cannot be called to
testify as to what occurred in the mediation. 119 In fact, the Indiana
117. See AM. C. L. UNION, A Pound of Flesh: The Criminalization of Private
Debt (2018), https://www.aclu.org/report/pound-flesh-criminalization-privatedebt; see also Chris Serres & Glenn Howatt, In Jail for Being in Debt,
STARTRIBUNE (Mar. 17, 2011), http://www.startribune.com/in-jail-for-being-indebt/95692619/.
118. Both Federal Law exempts certain federal benefits such as social security
from collection. 42 U.S.C. § 407(a) (1988). In addition, debtors cannot be
obligated to pay more than a certain percentage of their income on debts. IND.
CODE 24-4.5-5-105.
119. IND.A.D.R.RULE2.12.
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Supreme Court has ruled that, with regard to mediation proceedings,
only agreements reduced to writing are admissible in court. 120
Therefore, it is impossible for those sent to mediation to contest
what occurred during the course of that mediation. They could
refuse to sign or reach an agreement; however, that is not clear
either. No one asked them if they would like to mediate. The
unrepresented parties are sent by the judge to make a deal. The
process can be incredibly coercive. It is not reasonable to think pro
se litigants will come back to the judge who sent them off to make
a deal without one. There are countless individuals waiting for their
time in court. I seriously doubt many tenants in this situation would
come back to the judge without an agreement and demand a hearing.
It is not even clear if such a request would be entertained by the
court.
Despite these concerns, some communities are pushing ahead
with the notion that mediation programs will work. I strongly urge
them to reconsider. Better options are available. Jesse McCoy II
created one such model, the Eviction Diversion Program at Duke
Law School. 121 His program has been successful for three important
reasons. First, the intervention occurs prior to the eviction filing. 122
An eviction filing creates a stain on a renter's record whether or not
the tenant is subsequently evicted. Professor McCoy and his
students seek to negotiate a resolution with the landlord to preserve
the tenancy. 123 The goal is not to avoid a hearing, it is to avoid an
eviction. 124 Second, the program collaborates with the Durham
County Department of Social Services, which provides caseworkers
and, to those that qualify, emergency rental assistance. 125
An eviction can easily prevent the renter from being able to ever
rent again or force him to rent a substandard rental unit because
landlords in those situations will often turn a blind eye to a credit
report in exchange for a tenant who in turn does not raise concerns
about a home's conditions. Jesse McCoy's program does not tum a
blind eye to conditions, and this is the final reason the program is
120. Garrett S. Taylor, Be Careful What You Say In Mediation-Indiana
Supreme Court Rules That Oral Settlement Agreements Reached in Mediation
Must Be in Writing to be Enforceable-Kirk E. and Martha Vernon v. Adam J.
Acton, 201 J. OF DISP. RESOL. 375, 379 (2001).
121. Max Blau, It does Something to Your Soul When Everyone Losing Their
Homes
Looks
Like
You,
POLITICO
MAG.
(May
24,
2018),
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/05/24/what-works-next-durhamevictions-218416 (explaining the eviction diversion program, a collaboration with
Duke Law School's Civil Justice Clinic and Legal Aid of North Carolina).
122. Id. at 3.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Evictions in Richmond: Overview, Current Responses, and Program
Proposals
37
(Aug.
2019),
https://vpm.org/sites/default/files/201908/Richmond %20Eviction %20Report. pdf.
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working. When necessary, Professor McCoy and his students can
represent a tenant in court to defend a wrongful eviction. The tenants
are not coerced into settling what ought to be litigated. 126
Professor Brian Gilmore runs a similarly successful program at
Michigan State Law School. 127 Recently, a formal evaluation of the
program was written, documenting their success. The program has
reduced the number of evictions by nearly thirteen percent and the
number of defaults by twelve percent. 128 Unlike the program at
Duke, the interventions at Michigan State Law School (MSU) occur
after the eviction has been filed. Lawyers and law students meet with
the tenant and the landlord, if willing, to try to reach an alternative
to eviction. According to a report done on the program, landlords
"typically agree to allow the tenant to stay in the residence, and the
tenant [agrees] to pay a specific amount of money." 129 This may
seem like the Indiana mediation program discussed above, but it is
not for very significant reasons. In this program, the tenants have an
advocate--someone who is informing them of their rights and
helping to evaluate their case.
Default judgments also dropped significantly, especially
compared to other eviction courts in the same area not involved in
the program. 130 Getting more people to come to court is a significant
improvement. Whenever I ask a tenant why he or she failed to
appear at their eviction hearing, I get one of two answers: (1) I did
not know about it, or (2) it would not matter because everyone gets
evicted. Perhaps information about this program has given people
less confidence in reason number two and more hope that, if they
come to a hearing, they may be able to stay in their home. More
investigation is probably needed, but more people appearing for
hearings is never a bad outcome regardless of the reasons for the
mcrease.
What the MSU and Duke programs have in common may well
be their key to success. Tenants have a lawyer or other advocate
guiding them through the process and litigating when necessary.
Both have emergency funds available to assist with past-due rent.
All these factors are necessary for a program that works to stem the
flow of evictions.

126. Id.
127. Michigan
State
Law
School
Housing
Clinic,
https://www.law.msu.edu/clinics/housing.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2020.
128. Nick Gambler, Jordan Galvin & Andrew Sanders, An Analysis of the
Eviction Diversion Program at the 54-A District Court 4 (2017),
https://www.lansingmi.gov/DocumentCenterNiew/5528/2017 -EvictionDiversion-Pilot-Program-Final-Report.
129. Id. at 150.
130. Id. at 30.
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CAN WE STEM THE TIDE OF EVICTIONS?

I am reminded of the famous quote, "for ye have the poor always
with you." 131 We will always have the poor and, likewise, we will
always have evictions. We could be satisfied with that, but I hope
we are not. The impact of Matthew Desmond's work is clearly
visible when you compare the governmental response to the
financial crisis of 2008 to that of the coronavirus pandemic of 2020.
Evictions were not halted during the financial crisis. 132 As of March
20, 2020, every state except Utah has halted all or some evictions. 133
Indiana is among them. 134 HUD secretary Ben Carson has asked for
permission from Congress to suspend all public housing evictions,
citing the important connection between health and housing. 135
Every eviction will not be prevented, but many could be with a
few simple steps. Eviction diversion programs have succeeded
because they provided supportive services to the tenant. They are
not focused on easing the burden to the court, though this may be an
unintended result. If we are truly going to get the crisis under
control, several things must occur.
A. Increase the Availability of Housing

The lack of safe, affordable housing is clearly the most obvious
problem and the one most difficult to address. Professor Desmond
advocates for the creation of a universal housing choice voucher,
something like food stamps for all those who qualify financially. 136
Housing Choice vouchers are funded by the federal government.
The tenant pays the equivalent of thirty percent of their income, and
the government pays the rest. 137 It enables landlords to charge
131. Matthew 26: 11 (King James).
132. Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-22, 123
Stat. 1632 (2009). Title VII gave limited protection to tenants who were current
on the rent, but whose landlords had failed to make the mortgage payment.
133. Emily Bremer, Visiting Associate Professor at Columbia has been
compiling a spreadsheet of court and Governors' orders from across the country.
Nineteen states and the District of Columbia have expressly banned evictions
during the crisis (DE, HI, ID,IN, IA, KS,KY, MA, MD,MI, MN,NH, NJ, NY,
OR,PA,SC, TX,WA). The rest of the bans apply broadly to all civil actions. Emily
Bremer, email March 20, 2020 (on file with author).
134. Ind.
Exec.
Order
No.
20-06
(Mar.
6,
2020),
https://www.in.gov/gov/fi1es/E0_20-06.pdf.
135. Press Release, White House Coronavirus Task Force (March 21, 2020)
(https://www.gwinnettdailypost.com/multimedia/live-white-house-coronavirustask-force-press-conference--/article_bl 174dde-6b8b-l lea-83eaab91916ab9fa.html.)
136. Jake Blumgart, What an Affordable Housing Moonshot Would Look
Like, SLATE (July 2, 2016), https://slate.com/business/2016/07/its-time-foruniversal-housing-vouchers.html.
137. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o)(2)(A) (2018).
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market rent while at the same time providing tenants affordable
rent. 138 It is a steady flow of income to landlords, so one might think
landlords would universally accept them. Unfortunately, housing
choice vouchers come with their own set of issues for landlords.
Federal regulations require a lease for at least the first year, and one
that complies with all state and local laws. 139 You would think this
would not be an issue for landlords, but you would be wrong. Rental
leases are full of illegal and unenforceable provisions. 140 Many
tenants do not know what is or is not enforceable in a lease. As long
as landlords can get away with these illegal provisions, they have no
reason not to include them in the lease. Tenants will unknowingly
obey them.
Homes rented through the voucher program must also meet
certain quality standards, 141 though in practice those standards are
certainly not universally enforced. 142 Some landlords simply do not
want to bring the property up to building code standards, so they do
not accept vouchers. Landlords who accept vouchers can only evict
tenants for good cause during the term of the lease and they cannot
evict if the housing authority, not the tenant, fails to pay its portion
of the rent. 143 This may also discourage participation by some
landlords. Some landlords do not accept vouchers as a pretext to not
renting to minorities. Unfortunately, federal law does not require
landlords to accept vouchers. 144 Some have argued that refusing to
accept housing vouchers is a violation of the Fair Housing Act in
that it adversely affects minorities, specifically African Americans.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed in The Inclusive

138. 24C.F.R. § 982.1 (2015).
139. 24 C.F.R. § 982.308 (2015).
140. See Meriam Furth-Makin, On the Unexpected Use of Unenforceable
Contract Terms: Evidence from Residential Rental Market, 9 HARV. J. OF LEGAL
ANALYSIS 1 (2017).
141. 24 C.F.R. § 982.401 (2015).
142. For example, Miami Hills had been a HUD property in South Bend,
Indiana that had for years "passed" inspections. See Apartment at South Bend's
Miami Hills first to be condemned under city's new rental inspection program,
SOUTH
BEND
TRIB.
(May
24,
2019),
https://www.southbendtribune.com/news/local/apartment-at-south-bend-smiami-hills-first-to-be/article_abcda3e l -e98f-5808-bf5a-7bb2c707 47 d0.html;
See also Judith Fox, Viewpoint: Miami Hills Issues Demonstrate South Bend
Needs Safe, Affordable Housing, SOUTH BEND TRIB. (June 4, 2019),
https ://www. southbendtri bune. com/news/opinion/viewpoint/viewpoint-miamihills-issues-demonstrate-south-bend-needs-safe-affordable/article_b55b22584837-5e03-b47b-5d0416ab0786.html.
143. 24 C.F.R. § 982.310 (a), (b) (2016).
144. See Karim-Panahi v. 4000 Mass. Apts., 302 F. Supp. 3d 330, 337 (D.C.
2018); see also Austin Apt. Ass'n v. City of Austin, 89 F. Supp. 3d 886, 890
(W.D. Tex. 2015).
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Communities Project, Inc. v. Lincoln Property Company. 145 There
is a petition for certiorari pending at the U.S. Supreme Court, so we
may have an answer to this question in the coming months.
Some landlords simply will not accept vouchers because their
users are poor. Others reject them because housing is in such short
supply that they can charge more for other tenants. 146 Federal law
does not prevent discrimination based on source of income. 147 When
cities or states have enacted laws against source of income
discrimination, research shows an increase in landlords who accept
vouchers. 148 Currently, eleven states and over fifty cities and
counties have laws that prohibit landlords from refusing
vouchers. 149 Requiring landlords to accept housing vouchers would
increase housing options currently available to low-income
individuals without the expense of building it.
Yet, expanding the number of landlords who accept vouchers
will not solve the entire problem. We need to expand the numbers
of vouchers, hence the idea of a universal voucher. 150 The 2013
budget sequestration cuts eliminated 100,000 housing vouchers. 151
While the number of vouchers has been increasing since the end of
the financial crisis, they are not keeping up with demand. 152 In fact,
the increase is almost completely offset by the loss of public housing
or privately owned, subsidized housing. 153 Even before
sequestration, the vouchers did not meet demand. Cities such as
South Bend have waiting lists that are years long. Increasing the
available vouchers would certainly help the eviction problem, but it
145. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Lincoln Prop. Co., 920 F.3d 890 (5th
Cir. 2019), petition for cert docketed (Oct. 17, 2019).
146. See U.S. DEP'T Hous. URBAN DEV., A PILOT STUDY OF LANDLORD
ACCEPTANCE
OF
HOUSING
CHOICE
VOUCHERS
(Sept.
2018),
https ://www.huduser.gov/portal//portal/sites/default/files/pdf/LandlordAcceptance-of-Housing-Choice-Vouchers. pdf.
147. Allison Bell, Barbara Sard & Becky Koepnick, Prohibiting
Discrimination Against Renters Using Housing Vouchers Improves Results:
Lessons From Cities and States that Have Enacted Source of Income Laws, CTR.
ON
BUDGET
&
POL'Y
PRIORITIES
(Dec.
20,
2018),
https ://www.cbpp.org/si tes/default/files/ atoms/files/10-10-18hous. pdf.
148. Id. at 5-6.
149. Id. at 2-3. California, Delaware, Minnesota and Wisconsin have statutes
that prohibit discrimination based on source of income, but these exclude housing
vouchers. Id. at 1. For a complete list of the locations that have voucher protecting
laws, see id. at 16-21.
150. See Blumgart, supra note 136.
151. Douglas Rice, Obama Budget Restores Housing Vouchers: Targets
Vouchers to Reduce Homelessness, Help Victims of Domestic Violence, Keep
Families Together, C'TR ON BUDGET & POL'Y PRIORITIES 1 (Mar. 24, 2015).
152. Alician Mazzara, Housing Vouchers Work: Huge Demand, Insufficient
Funding for Housing Vouchers Means Long Wait, C'TR ON BUDGET & POL'Y
PRIORITIES (Apr. 19, 2017), https://www.cbpp.org/blog/housing-vouchers-workhuge-demand-insufficient-funding-for-housing-vouchers-means-long-waits.
153. Rice, supra note 151, at 12.
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won't cure it. Making them universal and requiring landlords to
accept them, might.
B. Governmental Reforms

Adequate housing is a human right. 154 Loss of housing is
devastating and has negative consequences not just for the person
losing the housing, but society in general. It is especially damaging
to children. This does not mean that governments must provide
housing for everyone. What it does mean is that governments must
combat the policies and spending priorities that are preventing
people from being housed. 155 In addition, governments are charged
with ensuring adequate protection from eviction, including
"adequate compensation for any real or personal property affected
by the eviction" and ensuring that the evicted do not become
homeless. 156 Our current legal process is failing to do either. Many
evicted families leave behind all their belongings because they have
nowhere to move them or store them. Charities are continually
charged with providing the most basic items, new beds particularly,
for evicted families. Homeless centers are strained to capacity.
Many families find themselves homeless, living on the street or in
cars.
The eviction process is incredibly stressful and hard to navigate
for those with little knowledge of the legal system. Frankly, it is hard
to navigate even for those with decades of experience in the courts.
Small claims courts, while designed to make the process easier, are
simply overwhelmed. As a result, these courts have become a
system dedicated to moving people through the eviction process and
out of their homes as quickly as possible. The judiciary too is
underfunded. Lawyers often act to slow down the process in those
cases where it is necessary. In addition, lawyers can work with
landlords to settle those cases that really can be settled before
reaching the judge. It just makes sense to provide counsel for all
eviction defendants.
There has been a chorus of voices advocating for the right to an
attorney in eviction cases for years. 157 Intuitively, the benefit of
154. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948).
155. U.N. Off. of the High Comm'r for Hum. Rts., The Human Right to
Adequate Housing,
Fact Sheet No.
21/Rev.
1 (Nov.
2009),
https ://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FS21 _rev_ l_Housing_en. pdf.
156. Id. at 5.
157. See generally Raymond H. Brescia, Sheltering Counsel: Towards a
Right to a Lawyer in Eviction Proceedings, 25 TOURO L. REV. 187 (2009); Rachel
Kleinman, Housing Gideon: The Right to Counsel in Eviction Cases, 31
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1507 (2004); Karl Monsma & Richard Lempert, The Value
of Counsel: 20 Years of Representation Before A Public Housing Eviction Board,
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counsel seems obvious. Several studies have been done, all
concluding that tenants get better substantive results if they have a
lawyer. 158 These studies are often criticized as flawed. Economists
would prefer a study of randomly selected sample of litigants, some
directed to lawyers and others left to fend for themselves. 159 To my
knowledge, no such study has been published. Therefore, we must
rely on the available research that does suggest parties would be
better off with an attorney.
C. Eviction Diversion Programs

Eviction diversion programs are having some success. We
should expand on this success, but not fall back into the old, flawed,
model of courthouse mediation. We have seen what works.
Programs need to have attorneys or advocates who are working with
and advocate for tenants. The programs cannot be designed
specifically to avoid trials. Instead, they should be designed to avoid
evictions. There is a difference.
Richmond has one of the highest eviction rates in the nation. 160
In August of 2019, several law students in the Richmond, Virginia
area collaborated to create a report on evictions and strategies to
address it. 161 Virginia recently passed a number of laws relating to
eviction. One of these created pilot eviction diversion programs in
four Virginia Cities: Danville, Hampton, Petersburg and Richmond.
This new law is slated to begin in July of 2020. 162 The report is a
wonderful roadmap into what is needed to stem the tide of evictions.
Richmond is attempting to duplicate programs like those run by
Professors Gilmore and McCoy. Both of these programs have a key
asset missing from most court sponsored efforts: case workers and
emergency funds available to stop the eviction. 163
Most evictions are the result of nonpayment of rent for whatever
reason. If the tenant had all the available back rent, he would not be
facing eviction. Most evicted tenants are low-income, meaning they
26 L. & SOCIETY REV. 627 (1992); Jared H. Fink, The Right to Counsel in Eviction
Proceedings; A Moral, Social, and Economic Imperative (Aug. 13, 2017),
available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3193417.
158. See, e.g., John Pollock, Recent Studies Compare Full Representation to
Limited Assistance in Eviction Cases, 42 NAT. HOUSING L. BULLETIN 73 (Mar. 1,
2012), available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2557654; see also Monsma,
supra note 157.
159. In their study of New York Housing Court, Professors Collinson and
Reed indicate that they will be "studying the effectiveness of legal representation
in future work." Collinson, supra note 12, at 31. This may well be the study we
have been waiting to see.
160. Id. at 1.
161. Evictions in Richmond, supra note 125, at 1-2.
162. VA. CODE ANN.§§ 55.1-1262 (2019).
163. Evictions in Richmond, supra note 125, at 33.
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are unlikely able to pay rent and an additional amount to catch up.
The expansion of programs like these will help keep those
individuals susceptible to eviction out of the courts. One of the most
promising programs, and one discussed in the symposium, is
currently running in St. Paul, Minnesota. CommonBond
Communities is a non-profit that provides housing servicers across
the Midwest. Several years ago, it developed an eviction prevention
program. 164 The program provides case managers who intervene as
soon as a person is unable to pay the rent. It looks to the causes of
the problem and helps the individual address the problem before it
becomes an eviction. It was not cheap, but the return on the dollar is
significant. A recent report on the program showed that for every
dollar spent, the program returned $4 in social benefits. 165 These
social benefits include children who did not have to change schools,
improved health, and increased local spending, to name just a
few. 166 Like the Duke Law School diversion program,
CommonBond has shown that intervention before the eviction is
filed is the most effective way to prevent evictions. 167 Programs like
this can make a significant difference to renters, landlords and their
communities.
D. Law Reform

Finally, we need to change the laws that govern eviction. I began
this article with a quote from Matthew Desmond. I return to that
now. A policy that "legitimizes and defends landlords' right to
charge as much as they want . . . forcibly removes a family at
landlords' request by dispatching armed law enforcement officers;
and that records and publicizes evictions, as a service to landlords
and debt collection agencies" causes exploitation in the housing
markets. 168 An eviction filing, whether or not the person is evicted,
has negative consequences for the tenant. Yet, these records stay on
the record indefinitely. Few states allow tenants to seal their eviction
record and, even then, only if it was the result of a foreclosure on
the rental property. 169 Minnesota gives the court discretion to
expunge an eviction record for other reasons, but the burden is high.
To prevail, a renter must show that the case was without a basis in

164. CommonBond Communities, Social Impact Measurement of
CommonBond's
Eviction
Prevention
Activities
l
(2018),
https :// commonbond.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/CommonBond-Socialimpact-report-Final. pdf.
165. Id. at 30.
166. See id. at 25-29.
167. Id. at 30-31.
168. MATTHEW DESMOND, supra note 1, at 307.
169. See CAL. Crv. PROC. CODE l 161.2(a)(l)(F) (West 2013); see also 735
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-l 70l(h)(6) (2013); MINN. STAT.§ 484.014 (2010).
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fact or law, that expungement is in the interests of justice and these
interests outweigh the public's interest in knowing about the
record. 170 Being evicted for failing to pay your rent is simply not
going to be enough.
It seems only fair that a tenant should not be scarred with an
eviction record when her only error was to rent from a landlord who
failed to make his mortgage payments. Likewise, a tenant who
successfully defended against the eviction should not be so branded.
Unfortunately, that is not the case. Because so many court dockets
are now available online, many landlords simply look up the name.
If a filing appears, they will refuse to rent to the applicant, regardless
of the outcome of the case. A tenant who wins his case should be
permitted to seal or expunge the eviction record. Negative credit
records stay on your credit report for seven years, 171 but a court
eviction filing is available forever. Is an eviction ten years ago really
relevant to a person's ability to rent today? Tenants should be able
to remove these negative records that are preventing them from
being able to access safe, affordable housing.
Tenants must have a reasonable right to defend themselves in
eviction proceedings. This includes being able to reach a judicial
officer when they have a defense. When a tenant withholds rent in a
desperate attempt to force the landlord into making necessary
repairs, those conditions should be a defense to eviction. Finally,
leases should be mandatory. Most of my low-income clients are atwill, month-to-month tenants and not by choice. The landlord
refuses to give them a lease. An at-will tenant can be evicted for no
reason at all. Human rights norms require governments to create
policy that "ensure security of tenure to all." 172 As the appalling
eviction statistics document, we are currently providing security of
tenure to none.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Eviction is a national crisis. It is a humanitarian crisis. It is a
health crisis. Yet, it has been a silent crisis because most of its
victims are poor. For a brief moment during the coronavirus
pandemic of 2020, policymakers seemed to recognize the
connections between health, housing and overall economic growth.
We need to cease this moment and mobilize against this eviction
cns1s. Universal housing vouchers would provide housing for
thousands who currently cannot afford rent. Adequately funded
diversion programs that provide both representation and emergency
funds could keep many in their homes who are facing eviction due
170. MINN. STAT. § 484.014, subdiv. 2 (2019).
171. 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a) (2019).
172. U.N. Off. of the High Comm'r for Hum. Rts., supra note 155, at 3.
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to a sudden loss of income. Attorneys for all tenants facing eviction
could prevent evictions that should not occur from occurring and
smooth the transitions for the cases where eviction will inevitably
occur. Finally, our laws and court processes must be reformed to
acknowledge the fundamental right of housing. Until our legal
system considers the rights of tenants as at least equivalent to the
rights of landlords, we will continue to see these staggering eviction
numbers. We can, and must, do better.

